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. Robinson With the Feb. 1 cease-fire between the government of President Alfredo Cristiani and the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), El Salvador entered into a complex and difficult
transition period. Signing of the 94-page treaty in Mexico City's Chapultepec Palace on Jan. 16, in
the presence of Latin American heads of states and other foreign dignitaries, constitutes a symbolic
milestone in Latin American history. The peace accords, which put an end to nearly 12 years of
civil war that cost several billion dollars and 80,000 lives, have raised hopes for further pacification
and economic recovery in Central America. The accords also set an example of peace-throughnegotiations for countries in other parts of the hemisphere, and indeed, throughout the Third
World. However, the signing of the accords also opened up an extremely complicated transition,
fraught with uncertainties. What the two sides agreed to on paper must now be transformed
into reality. Salvadorans face a process of reconciliation, reconstruction and democratization in
the context of a highly politicized and polarized society, and widespread poverty aggravated by
enormous expectations generated by the prospects for peace. The next few months are sure to
be marked by conflicting interpretations of the accords, setbacks, mutual accusations of breaches
in compliance, splits within the armed forces, the government and opposition camps, heated
political battles and even sporadic violent clashes. Some of the critical issues that Salvadorans
face in the transition to peace, democracy and national reconstruction are summarized below. *
An unmitigated economic crisis and delays in reconstruction could generate social tensions that
undermine the peace process. The war caused an estimated $1 billion in direct damages plus billions
more in indirect losses, a shattered infrastructure, stagnation and even total paralysis of entire
industries, and widespread poverty. Foreign aid is considered essential for reconstruction and
economic recovery. The Salvadoran government has estimated reconstruction costs at nearly US
$2 billion. Some aid is expected from the US, the European Economic Community (EEC), Japan,
the "Group of Friends" (Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela), and multilateral financial
institutions. However, in times of austerity, global recession and an international emphasis on free
market forces as panacea, it is doubtful that the government will obtain US$2 billion in foreign
assistance. For example, after having sent about US$4 billion in economic and military aid to El
Salvador during the 1980s, the US has so far pledged only US$250 million for reconstruction. The
experience of neighboring Nicaragua is not encouraging in this regard. The government of President
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro had hoped to receive about US$2 billion in international relief and
reconstruction assistance after the armed conflict in that country was resolved. Since Chamorro
took office in April 1990, the government has received less than half that amount. Much of the
aid obtained is earmarked for debt relief or consists of loans to support economic liberalization
policies, not reconstruction. * The peace process is bitterly opposed by the far right. The far right has
clearly lost much of the power it once enjoyed. Nonetheless, remnants of the traditional oligarchy,
together with far-right factions within the armed forces and certain political parties, including the
governing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party, still wield enough influence to attempt
sabotage of the transition. A new death squad made its appearance on Jan. 8, only a week before
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the accords were signed. The "Secret Army of National Salvation" issued death threats against 11
members of the National Council of Churches, and accused Catholic Archbishop Arturo Rivera y
Damas and Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chavez of being "communist collaborators." In veiled
reference to the far-right threat, Chavez said, "There will be other sources of violence that will
remain active...If we want to achieve reconciliation in El Salvador, dismantlement [of death squads
and other violence-prone groups] must be the first step." * Over 25% of all Salvadorans (5.4 million)
have been displaced by the war. At least 700,000 Salvadorans are in the United States and another
300,000 in neighboring countries. An estimated half a million more are considered internal refugees.
Any sudden or massive repatriation especially in the absence of large-scale foreign aid could place
enormous strain on existing social infrastructure and exacerbate political tensions. The threat by
the US Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport Salvadoran refugees could very well
undermine the peace process. Once again, the Nicaraguan experience is instructive. Given the
lack of resources to reintegrate repatriated populations, the return of some 250,000 former contra
combatants, their family members, and refugee and exile communities from neighboring countries
and the US has sharply escalated tensions and contributed to the resurgence of armed movements
in the countryside. * The position assumed by the US during the transition period will be crucial.
Many consider the US responsible in large part for prolonging the Salvadoran conflict through
direct political and military intervention aimed at sustaining repressive and anti-popular regimes.
Until 1990, Washington consistently opposed a negotiated solution. Many were encouraged by
assurances reportedly given to the FMLN by assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs
Bernard Aronson that Washington's war against the Salvadoran rebels has definitively ended
and that the US is committed to the reforms outlined in the accords. The same is true regarding
statements made by Secretary of State James Baker in San Salvador on Jan. 17 that the US would
not tolerate attempts by the far-right to sabotage the peace process. On the other hand, many
observers suspect Washington will shift to new forms of political intervention by supporting favored
groups in El Salvador through such entities as the quasi-governmental National Endowment for
Democracy (NED). Will the US oppose any significant role for the left in post-war reconstruction?
Will Washington work openly and/or clandestinely to prevent the left and progressive forces from
achieving significant institutional influence, or to come to power through elections, such as occurred
in Haiti? (See article by Robinson, NotiSur 01/22/92.) (cont.)
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